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STOPPING HATE WITHOUT STIFLING
SPEECH: RE-EXAMINING THE MERITS OF
HATE SPEECH CODES ON
UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES
Catherine B. Johnson*
Judge for yourself. Go to an American college campus and you
will see and hear hate speech. It might be a racial or sexual
insult or epithet, a threat, a demeaning joke, or degrading stere-
otype. It might be posted on a dormitory bulletin board or
scratched into a bathroom stall or overheard in the hall. You
might read it in the campus newspaper or access it through a
computer terminal or have it mysteriously "spammed" onto
your screen. Students, professors, staff, administrators: they
use hate speech, sometimes intentionally, sometimes unwit-
tingly, and there is no safe haven.'
INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has ever been the victim of harsh, biting, insidious
speech about his or her race, religion or sexual orientation knows
that, although "sticks and stones may break your bones," names
may hurt too. The sting is arguably even worse, as it permeates
deep within the self and often remains there indefinitely, re-playing
in the mind over and over until it becomes truth. Wounds of this
kind leave a scar with which wounds from a stick or a stone could
never compare.
On college campuses across the country, these verbal assaults
are becoming all too frequent, taking the form of racist, sexist,
harassing speech directed at certain groups in the educational com-
munity. While scholars, lawyers and administrators debate the
merits of different approaches to deal with hate speech, student-
victims shrink further into silence and isolation, unable to partici-
pate fully in the educational process.
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2001; B.A,, English and
Communications, magna cum laude, Boston College, 1998. I would like to thank Pro-
fessor Abner Greene for his valuable insights and Professor Donald Fishman at Bos-
ton College who first sparked my interest in First Amendment law. Special thanks to
Bob Schumacher, who encouraged and supported me in this endeavor. Finally, I also
would like to thank my family, who make everything I do possible.
1. TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL 2 (1998).
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In response to the rising incidents of hate speech on college cam-
puses in the late 1980s and early 1990s, some public universities
attempted to enact speech codes, which the courts quickly dis-
missed on First Amendment grounds.2 However, the incidents of
hate and harassment on campuses have not subsided and the re-
sulting harm to the victims has not disappeared. There is a need to
re-evaluate this situation, without viewing it as an all or nothing
proposition-either free speech or equality. There is room for
compromise at the center of the storm. In the face of the courts'
earlier dismissals of speech codes, schools have lapsed into com-
plete inaction. By doing so, these institutions are failing in their
responsibility to provide an equal educational opportunity for their
students.
This Note argues that although public universities should be
lauded for their initial attempts to regulate hate through speech
codes, such attempts, as drafted, were broad and overreaching.
Part I analyzes the rise in hate speech codes at public universities
as a response to tensions on campus and how courts ultimately
struck them down as unconstitutional. This part will also examine
two relevant U.S. Supreme Court decisions relating to harassing
and discriminatory expressions and conduct, R.A. V. v. City of St.
PauP and Wisconsin v. Mitchell.4 Part II presents the essential con-
flict between the ideals of ensuring academic diversity and equal-
ity, and the ideal of encouraging free and unfettered discourse in
the academic setting. Part III asserts that current U.S. Supreme
Court decisions provide a narrow framework within which univer-
sities could, and should, work to punish and deter the most egre-
gious one-on-one instances of hate and harassment without facing
serious constitutional challenges.
This Note concludes that a combination of these methods can act
as a guideline for drafting a narrow hate speech code based on rec-
ognized First Amendment exceptions. Such a code, implemented
along with educational initiatives, could work to stop hate without
stifling free speech on university campuses.
2. This Note focuses on public universities because they are constitutionally
bound by the First Amendment. A private university may agree to abide by these
principles, but is not required to do so.
3. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
4. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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I. THE RISE AND FALL OF UNIVERSITIES' INITIAL ATTEMPTS
TO MAINTAIN HATE SPEECH CODES
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, national media attention began
to focus on the increase in racial, ethnic, religious, sexist and
homophobic incidents on college campuses across the United
States.' As the social climate on campuses grew increasingly hos-
tile,6 school administrators ultimately sought solutions in the form
of hate speech or discriminatory harassment codes. Legal battles
followed, demonstrating the judicial commitment to protecting free
speech.7
A. Campus Incidents Signal a Rise in Hate
Events at two schools, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
("Michigan") and the University of Wisconsin ("Wisconsin") are
indicative of the rise in incidents of racial and ethnic unrest that
5. See, e.g., Howard J. Ehrlich, Ph.D., Prejudice and Ethnoviolence on Campus, 6
HIGHER EDUC. EXTENSION SERVICE REV. (visited Jan. 25, 1999) <http://
www.review.org/issues/vol6no2.html>. "Ethnoviolence" is defined as "acts motivated
by prejudice... intended to cause physical or psychological harm to persons because
of their actual or perceived membership in a group." Id. at J 14. The study reports
that:
In 1987, 42 campuses had ethnoviolent incidents that drew substantial media
attention. This compares to 103 colleges in 1988, and 113 in 1989 .... In the
1992-93 academic year, a U.S. News and World Report (April 19, 1993) sur-
vey of 550 student newspaper editors revealed that 71 percent of the colleges
(85 percent for institutions with enrollments over 10,000) had at least one
reported ethnoviolent incident during the school year... these estimates are
understatements.
Id. 7.
6. See, e.g., id. at tbl. 1 (indicating illustrative incidents of ethnoviolence from
1986-1994). Some examples cited in the report include: white members of the wres-
tling team at the University of Minnesota at Morris drove two black teammates to a
roadside location where other team members wearing Ku Klux Klan hoods were wait-
ing by a burning cross; Pi Kappa Alpha fraternity at Texas Technological University
staged an event billed as a "party in the projects," where members at the party wore
blackface, Afro wigs, and demeaning costumes; swastikas were drawn on the door of
a room occupied by two Jewish freshmen at the University of California, Los Angeles;
the University of Central Florida's school newspaper, along with 24 other university
newspapers, published an "advertisement" implying that there was "no convincing
proof that even one individual was gassed in a German program of genocide;" groups
of students at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, appeared on campus wearing
sweatshirts with the motto "Death Before Dishonor," which was printed above a logo
which read "Anti-Fag Society." See id.; see also Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hol-
lers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990)
(chronicling incidents at campuses across the country ranging from racist leaflets, to
"Death Nigger" inscriptions, to bomb threats at a Jewish Student Union).
7. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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began in the latter half of the 1980s and continued into the early
part of the 1990s.8
1. The University of Michigan
On January 27, 1987, flyers were anonymously distributed on
Michigan's Ann Arbor campus, declaring "open season" on
blacks.9 On the flier, blacks were referred to as "saucer lips, porch
monkeys, and jigaboos.' Shortly thereafter, on February 4, 1987,
a student disc jockey for the campus radio station allowed racist
jokes to be told on-air." In response to these incidents, students at
the University staged a demonstration to voice their opposition.
The rally, however, was interrupted by the display of a Ku Klux
Klan uniform dangling out of a nearby dormitory window.' 2
The tension continued to mount in Ann Arbor when a computer
file containing racist jokes was discovered,' 3 as was as a second ra-
cist flier proclaiming "Niggers get off campus" and "Darkies don't
belong in classrooms-they belong hanging from trees." 4 Follow-
ing this series of events, vandals repeatedly damaged shanties,
which had been constructed in an open campus area to protest
South African Apartheid. 15
2. The University of Wisconsin
In May 1987, Phi Gamma Delta fraternity at Wisconsin staged a
"Fiji Island" party in which a large caricature of a black Fiji is-
lander with a bone in his nose was erected and paraded around the
party by members dressed in tropical garb.16 Additionally, the next
fall, this fraternity crashed a closed party held by the predomi-
nantly Jewish fraternity Zeta Beta Tau.17 A fight ensued as mem-
bers of Phi Gamma Delta began making racial and ethnic slurs.1 8
8. The Note's focus on these schools is due in large part to the subsequent litiga-
tion of these cases. There are many more examples illustrative of the rise in campus
unrest, which are not discussed here.
9. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
10. See id. at 854 ("[I]n the last three years incidents of racism and racial harass-
ment appeared to become increasingly frequent at the University.").
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See SHIELL, supra note 1, at 18.
14. See supra note 5, at tbl. 1 (indicating illustrative examples of ethnoviolence
from 1986-1994).
15. See SHIELL, supra note 1, at 18.
16. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).




The incidents did not end there however. In the fall of 1988, the
same Zeta Beta Tau fraternity that had been victimized the year
before, now held a "slave auction" fundraiser at which racial paro-
dies of black entertainers were performed by pledges. 19
B. Schools Counter With Codes
Following these events, students, faculty, higher education offi-
cials and civil rights activists besieged school administrators at
Michigan and Wisconsin, criticizing their failure to maintain a tol-
erant environment for all students.20 Petitions were circulated, le-
gal action was proposed2 ' and open forum meetings were called.22
Each of these actions increased the universities' need to get
involved.
1. The Michigan Solution
The action was to come in the form of racial harassment policies,
the first and most prominent one at Michigan.3 At a January 15,
1988 meeting of the Board of Regents (the "Board"), the acting
president of the University proposed a policy that would enable the
19. See id. ("In one of the skits, pledges in blackface and 'afro' wigs lip-synched
Michael Jackson songs. In another skit, a pledge impersonated Oprah Winfrey while
two others taunted him sexually.").
20. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich.
1989). On March 5, 1987, the Chairperson of the State House of Representatives
Appropriations Subcommittee on Higher Education staged a public hearing at the
Ann Arbor campus to address the problem of racism at the school. See id. In front of
an audience of 600, 48 speakers expressed their criticism of the University's response
to the outbreak of incidents, basically chastising the school for ignoring the plight of
minority students. See id. The Chairperson ended the meeting by stating, "Michigan
legislators will not tolerate racism on the campus of a state institution .... Some
things have to change .... Holding up funds as a club may be part of our response,
but that will predicate on how the university responds." Id.
21. See id. at 854. The United Coalition Against Racism (UCAR), a campus anti-
discrimination group, stated that it intended to file a class action civil rights suit
against the University for failure to maintain a "non-violent atmosphere." See id.
22. See id. (noting that, in addition to the public hearing with the Subcommittee
on Higher Education, the University also met with civil rights leaders in March of
1987 to discuss how they may remedy the racial problems on campus).
23. The policy drafted by the University of Michigan is certainly not the first or
only one of its kind, but again is chosen as the focus because of its subsequent litiga-
tion. See UWM Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 n.1 (E.D. Wis.
1991) ("At least fifteen colleges and universities, including nine state institutions,
have adopted or are considering restrictions on discriminatory hate speech directed at
members of historically disadvantaged groups," (citing Wilson, Colleges' Anti-Harass-
ment Policies Bring Controversy Over Free Speech Issues, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUC., Oct. 4, 1989, at Al)).
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University "to take the position that it was willing to do something
about this issue." 24
At the close of the meeting, the acting president appointed the
Director of the University Office of Affirmative Action to draft the
Mi chigan hate speech policy (the "Michigan Policy" or "Policy").2 5
After consulting with the Office of University Counsel and the
Law School professors, fielding student, staff and faculty com-
ments, and working through twelve drafts, the Board unanimously
adopted the policy in April of 1988.26
The Michigan Policy delineated three tiers of speech that set the
degree of regulation according to where the conduct took place.27
The first tier described forms of speech that were exempt from the
policy, such as school-sponsored publications.2 8 The second tier
consisted of "public parts" and could only be regulated in instances
of physical violence or destruction of property.2 9 The third tier in-
cluded "educational and academic centers, such as classroom build-
ings, libraries, research laboratories, recreation and study centers"
and imposed discipline for verbal or physical behavior or threats to
an individual based on their "race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status," or for sexual advances.3 °
24. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 855. The president also noted that such a policy could
implicate serious First Amendment concerns, but argued that
[Jiust as an individual cannot shout "Fire!" in a crowded theatre and then
claim immunity from prosecution for causing a riot on the basis of exercising
his rights of free speech, so a great many of American universities have
taken the position that students at a university cannot by speaking or writing
discriminatory remarks which seriously offend many individuals beyond the
immediate victim, And which, therefore detract from the necessary educa-




26. See id. at 856. The policy became effective May 31, 1988.
27. See id.
28. See SHIELL, supra note 1, at 19.
29. See id.
30. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856. The policy states,
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individ-
ual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed,
national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era vet-
eran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic ef-
forts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular ac-
tivities or personal safety; or
1826
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Pursuant to the Michigan Policy, a system of hearing procedures
and varying sanctions was instituted.31 The policy was followed the
next fall by an interpretive guide ("the Guide") issued by the Uni-
versity's Office of Affirmative Action entitled "What Students
Should Know About Discrimination and Discriminatory Harass-
ment by Students in the University Environment," which pur-
ported to be the authoritative interpretation of the Michigan
Policy.3
2
2. The Wisconsin Solution
In response to incidents of discriminatory harassment, the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin's twenty-six campuses adopted a plan known
as "Design for Diversity" ("the Wisconsin Plan") in May of 1988.11
The purpose of the Wisconsin Plan was to "increase minority rep-
resentation, multi-cultural understanding and greater diversity. "'34
The Plan led to the revision of the student conduct code that would
implement a university-wide rule regarding racial and discrimina-
tory conduct.35 In June of 1989, the Board of Regents adopted the
rule (the "UW Rule"or "Rule"), which stated that the University
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an
individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University spon-
sored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for educa-
tional pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extra-
curricular activities.
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical con-
duct that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex or sexual
orientation where such behavior:
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic ef-
forts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular ac-
tivities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an
individual's academic efforts, employment participation in University spon-
sored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for educa-
tional pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extra-
curricular activities.
Id. On August 22, 1989, the University, without notifying the court or the defendant,
withdrew section 1(c) of the policy for further clarification. See id. at 858.
31. See id. at 857 (explaining the hearing process and the potential sanctions that
may be imposed, including formal reprimand, community service, class attendance,
restitution, loss of university housing, suspension from courses or activities, or
expulsion).
32. See id. at 857-58. In the winter of 1989, the University withdrew the Guide
because the "information in it was not accurate." Id.
33. See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1164.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1165.
2000] 1827
1828 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
may discipline students for comments directed at other students
that are intentionally meant to demean the individual based on his
ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation, for example, and which
create a hostile learning environment.36
36. Id. at 1166. The UW Rule proscribed these situations,
2) (a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expres-
sive behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at different
individuals, or for physical conduct, if such comments, epithets or other ex-
pressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individ-
uals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for
education, university-related work, or other university-authorized
activity.
(b) Whether the intent required under par.(a) is present shall be deter-
mined by consideration of all relevant circumstances.
(c) In order to illustrate the types of conduct which this subsection is
designed to cover, the following examples are set forth. These examples are
not meant to illustrate the only situations or types of conduct intended to be
covered.
1. A student would be in violation if:
(a) He or she intentionally made demeaning remarks to an
individual based on that person's ethnicity, such as name calling,
racial slurs, or "jokes"; and
(b) His or her purpose in uttering the remarks was to make
the educational environment hostile for the person to whom the
demeaning remark was addressed.
2. A student would be in violation if:
(a) He or she intentionally placed visual or written material
demeaning the race or sex of an individual in that person's univer-
sity living quarters or work area; and
(b) His or her purpose was to make the educational environ-
ment hostile for the person in whose quarters or work area the ma-
terial was placed.
3. A student would be in violation if he or she seriously damaged
or destroyed private property or any member of the university commu-
nity or guest because of that person's race, sex, religion, color, creed,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age.
4. A student would not be in violation if, during a class discussion,
he or she expressed a derogatory opinion concerning a racial or ethnic
group. There is no violation, since the student's remark was addressed
to the class as a whole, not to a specific individual. Moreover, on the
facts as stated, there seems no evidence that the student's purpose was
to create a hostile environment.
Thus, in order to be regulated under the UW Rule, a comment, epithet or
other expressive behavior must:
(1) Be racist or discriminatory;
(2) Be directed at an individual;
(3) Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orien-
tation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual addressed; and
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Wisconsin also created a brochure that was made available to
students and faculty explaining the UW Rule and the possible
scope of its application.37 By the time it was challenged in court, it
had been enforced against at least nine students38 with various
sanctions including probation coupled with community service, 9
psychological counseling4° and a seven-month school suspension.4'
C. Speech Regulations Fail Under Constitutional Challenges
It was not long before the universities' efforts to regulate hateful
expression were challenged in court, pitting the idealistic goals of
fostering equality in the academic environment against the First
Amendment principles of free speech.
1. Doe v. University of Michigan42
The Michigan Policy was challenged by a psychology graduate
student who argued that his right to discuss certain biological theo-
ries positing differences between the sexes and races was impermis-
(4) Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for edu-
cation, university-related work, or other university-authorized activity.
Id. at 1165-66.
37. See id. at 1166-67. The brochure provided illustrations of instances in which
the UW Rule would or would not apply. It provided an example that in a classroom
situation in which a male student says that women are naturally better equipped to be
mothers, not executives, that student would not be in violation of the policy. See id.
This is because the comment was made in an academic setting and the UW Rule only
sets out ways in which a student can be disciplined in non-academic situations. How-
ever, a student living in the university residence hall who continually calls a black
student a "nigger" possibly could be sanctioned under the terms of the code. See id.
This is true because the comment was made in a non-academic setting, was directed at
a specific individual, demeans that individuals race, and potentially creates an intimi-
dating and hostile educational environment for the victim.
38. See id. at 1167. The policy had been in effect for approximately two years at
this point.
39. See id. In response to statements made by a young woman in the school news-
paper about the athletic department at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire,
plaintiff John Doe yelled epithets at the woman, including "fucking bitch" and "fuck-
ing cunt." Id. He was placed on probation for his behavior and required to perform
community service at a shelter for abused women. See id.
40. See id. at 1168 (recounting an episode in which a male student at the River
Falls campus yelled "you've got nice tits" to a female student in public and was later
placed on probation, asked to apologize to the female and refrain from further con-
tact with her, and required to obtain psychological counseling).
41. See id. at 1167-68 (describing the issuance of a seven month suspension to a
student who called one residence hall staff member a "piece of shit nigger" and an-
other a "South American immigrant," as well as obstructing a university official after
the confrontation by misidentifying himself).
42. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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sibly chilled as a result of the policy.4 3 He argued that the
Michigan Policy was unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness
and overbreadth and should be enjoined.4 After finding that he
had standing to challenge the policy 5 and that the expression pro-
hibited by the code fell into a protected category of speech,46 the
district court found the Michigan Policy to be in violation of the
First Amendment.47 It held that "the fundamental infirmity of the
Policy" was that it prohibited a "substantial amount of constitu-
tionally protected conduct. ' 48 Therefore, the Policy was fatally
overbroad on its face and as applied in the previous year.49
The court also stated that the terms were impermissibly vague,
and to enforce the Policy would be a violation of the due process
clause.5 0 The court looked at the plain meaning of the language
and found that "it was simply impossible to discern any limitation
on its scope or any conceptual distinction between protected and
unprotected conduct."'"
43. See id. at 858.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 859-60 (arguing that an individual has standing to challenge a stat-
ute's constitutionality if he can show a "realistic and credible threat of enforcement,"
which was evidenced here by the legislative history, the Guide and experiences shown
through a year of enforcement).
46. See id. at 862-63 (presenting the limitations permissible on pure speech, such
as speech constituting "fighting words," speech intended to incite imminent lawless
action, speech which is "vulgar" or "obscene" and libelous speech).
47. See id. at 868. "While the [c]ourt is sympathetic to the University's obligation
to ensure equal educational opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not
be at the expense of free speech." Id. The court, in condemning the University for
regulating speech because of its offensive message stated, "If there is any star fixed in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion ....
Nor could simply the University proscribe speech simply because it was found to be
offensive, even gravely so, by large numbers of people." Id. at 863.
48. Id. at 864.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 866 ("A statute is unconstitutionally vague 'when men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning'.... A statute must give adequate
warning as to the conduct which is to be prohibited and must set out explicit standards
for those who apply it.").
51. Id. at 867. Even the University's counsel found it difficult to clearly delineate
protected from punishable expression: "During oral argument, the Court asked the
University's counsel how he would distinguish between speech which was merely of-
fensive, which he conceded was protected, and speech which 'stigmatizes or victim-
izes' . . . [c]ounsel replied 'very carefully."' Id.
1830
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2. UWM Post v. Board of Regents5 2
The UW Rule, though clearer and narrower in scope than the
Michigan Policy and accompanied by a more sophisticated guide,
was nonetheless challenged in court less than one year after its
adoption. 3 The plaintiffs, the University of Wisconsin at Milwau-
kee ("UWM") student newspaper, UWM Post, Inc., and an anony-
mous student filed suit against the Board of Regents, challenging
the constitutionality of the plan. 4
The University presented four main arguments in support of the
code: (1) it only regulated speech which fell within the unpro-
tected "fighting words" category;55 (2) even if not technically
within the fighting words doctrine, the balancing test used by the
court in Chaplinsky rendered the speech unprotected;5 6 (3) its lan-
guage paralleled Title VII law;57 and (4) its reach may be limited by
applying a narrow construction, even if as written the rule may be
unconstitutional. 58
The federal court rejected each of these arguments, countering
point by point: (1) the fighting words doctrine had been narrowed
over the years and the UW Rule did not meet the evolved crite-
ria;59 (2) the balancing test did not support the University's case;60
52. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
53. See SHIELL, supra note 1, at 79.
54. See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1164. The challenge was based on overbreadth
and vagueness grounds. See id.
55. For a discussion of the fighting words category, see supra Part II.A.2.a.
56. See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1173. The Board argued that the Chaplinsky
Court used a balancing approach in which the-speech's "value as a step to truth" is
weighed against the "social interest in order and morality." See Chaplinksy v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
57. Title VII addresses equal employment opportunities and states,
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1999).
58. See UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1177. The Board cites Boos v. Barry, which
states that "[i]t is well settled that federal courts have the power to adopt narrowing
constructions of federal legislation" provided the construction is "reasonable and
readily apparent." 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988).
59. See id. at 1169-73. The court, after defining the fighting words doctrine as "(1)
words which by their very utterance inflict injury and (2) words which by their very
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(3) Title VII law does not apply and is therefore not a suitable
parallel; 61 and (4) even the limiting construction is overbroad. 62 In
addition, the court found the code to be unduly vague as to the
intent required. 63 As a result of the above findings, plaintiffs' mo-
tion for summary judgment was granted, and the court ordered
that Wisconsin be permanently enjoined from enforcing the Rule.64
The decisions in the Michigan and Wisconsin cases demonstrate
the courts' deep commitment to the principles of free speech, espe-
cially in the university context. 65 "These [two] cases served notice
to the nation's campuses that any speech restrictions (whether in
the form of an official speech code or not) that they intended to
enforce had better be very carefully drafted and very carefully jus-
tified."' 66 Timothy Shiell, author of Campus Hate Speech on Trial,
posits that a campus speech code would have to meet narrow re-
utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," argued that the definition
has been narrowed and clarified to refer only to the second part. Id. at 1169-70 (citing
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978)).
Under this refined definition, the court held that "[slince the elements of the UW
Rule do not require that the regulated speech, by its very utterance, tend to incite
violent reaction, [it] goes beyond the present scope of the fighting words doctrine."
Id. at 1172.
60. See id. at 1173-77. In reference to the balancing test, in which the value of
speech is weighed against the costs of its restriction, the court concluded that this
approach may only be employed to determine constitutionality if the speech regula-
tion is content-neutral, which the Wisconsin Plan was not. See id. (citing American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)).
61. See id. at 1177. The Board's argument that the UW Rule parallels Title VII
law, which requires that an employer take corrective action when it discovers "perva-
sive illegal harassment," was rejected by the court for three reasons: (1) Title VII law
addresses the employment context and not the educational; (2) Title VII law is based
in agency principles and students cannot be considered agents of the school; and (3) a
statute, such as Title VII, cannot supersede the First Amendment requirements. See
id.
62. See id. at 1177-78 ("This [c]ourt, nonetheless, refuses to adopt the limiting con-
struction offered by the Board of Regents since that construction fails to solve the
UW Rule's overbreadth difficulties.").
63. See id. at 1178-81. "[T]he rule is ambiguous since it fails to make clear
whether the speaker must actually create a hostile educational environment or if he
must merely intend to do so." Id. at 1179.
64. See id. at 1181 (recognizing that "[t]he problems of bigotry and discrimination
sought to be addressed here are real and truly corrosive of the educational environ-
ment," but that "freedom of speech is almost absolute in our land").
65. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich.
1989) ("These principles acquire a special significance in the university setting, where
the free and unfettered interplay of competing views is essential to the institution's
educational mission.").
66. SHIELL, supra note 1, at 82.
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quirements 67 in order to be upheld in a federal court, or universi-
ties would have to hope for a reversal by a higher court.
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court may have thwarted those hopes
when it announced its ruling on a St. Paul, Minnesota hate crimes
ordinance, which punished offenders for bias-motivated crimes.68
The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional, sending a strong
signal that content-based regulations must withstand strict scrutiny
review.69 In addition, the Court made it clear that restrictions on
speech based on disapproval with the speaker's message are at
odds with the fundamental tenets of the Constitution.7" Though
not directly about hate speech codes in the university setting, the
decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul remains a stumbling block for
attempts at hate speech regulation.
3. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul7a
In the early hours of June 21, 1990 a group of teenagers, includ-
ing the petitioner, allegedly constructed a cross from broken chair
legs and set it ablaze inside the fenced yard of a black family.72
The city charged the then juvenile petitioner, R.A.V., under the St.
Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,73 which provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not lim-
ited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.74
The trial court granted the petitioner's motion to dismiss on the
ground that the ordinance was "substantially overbroad and imper-
67. See id. Shiell argues that a
code must (1) not regulate protected speech on its face or punish protected
speech in its application, (2) be sufficiently clear to provide a "bright line"
for students to guide their conduct by, (3) be content-neutral, and (4) pro-
mote a compelling state interest that cannot be adequately furthered by
other means.
Id.
68. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
69. See id. at 382.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 379.
73. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
74. Id.
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missibly content based and therefore facially invalid under the First
Amendment. 75
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the over-
breadth claim because the phrase "arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment in others" limits the statute to reach only conduct
constituting "fighting words," which do not receive First Amend-
ment protection.76
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, noting that it was
bound by the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the
statute to reach only conduct amounting to "fighting words. '77
Nevertheless, the Court unanimously reversed, holding that the
"ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses."78
Although all nine justices agreed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional, they sharply disagreed in their reasoning.79 Justice Scalia
wrote the majority opinion for the Court, with Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joining.80 Scalia
began the opinion by outlining the constitutional principles that
support his views, namely that the First Amendment generally pre-
vents the government from proscribing speech or expressive con-
duct because of disapproval with its content. 81 There are a few
limited exceptions to this rule in categories such as obscenity, defa-
mation and fighting words. 82 However, Justice Scalia argued that
even those categories are not "entirely invisible to the Constitu-
tion."83 For example, the government may prohibit libel, but it
may not prohibit libel critical of the government because it is im-
75. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 380.
76. See id. at 380-81 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942), which defines "fighting words" as "conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to
incite immediate violence"). In regard to petitioner's claim that the statute was im-
permissibly content based, the Court contended that it was a "narrowly tailored
means toward accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the
community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and order," and therefore,
withstood strict scrutiny review. Id. at 381.
77. See id.
78. Id. The Court explained that the rationale for prohibitions on content-based
discrimination is that the function of the Government is not to drive specific ideas
from the marketplace because of the views expressed therein. See id. at 387.
79. See id. at 378.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 382.




permissible content-based regulation.84 Similarly, the Court has up-
held reasonable time, place and manner restrictions, provided
they were justified without reference to the content of the speech.86
Additionally, Scalia disagreed that fighting words are undeserv-
ing of protection in all respects. 87 Instead, he argued that the abil-
ity to proscribe certain speech is based on its non-content, not its
content element.88
Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each
is, as Justice Frankfurter recognized, "a mode of speech," both
can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a
claim upon the First Amendment. As with the sound truck,
however, so also with fighting words: The government may not
regulate use based on hostility - or favoritism - towards the
underlying message expressed.89
While Scalia contended that the prohibition against content re-
strictions "is not absolute,"90 he emphasized that such restrictions
can only be valid if "there is no realistic possibility that official sup-
pression of ideas is afoot." 91
In applying these principles to the facts in R.A. V., Scalia found
the St. Paul ordinance to be facially unconstitutional. He ex-
plained that although the Minnesota Supreme Court had inter-
preted it to reach only fighting words, the ordinance applied only
to those fighting words based on "race, color, creed, religion, or
gender." 2 Other fighting words, such as those directed at a per-
84. See id. at 384.
85. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 ("A State or
municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content."); see also Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976) (stating that time, place, and manner regulations have been approved when
"they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they
serve a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information").
86. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386.
87. See id. at 385 ("We have not said that they constitute 'no part of the expression
of ideas,' but only that they constitute 'no essential part of any exposition of ideas."'
(quoting Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572) (emphasis omitted)).
88. See id. at 386 ("In other words, the exclusion of 'fighting words' from the
scope of the First Amendment simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment,
the unprotected features of the words are, despite their verbal character, essentially a
'nonspeech' element of communication.").
89. Id. (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring)).
90. Id. at 387.
91. Id. at 390.
92. Id. at 391.
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son's "political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality,"
were permitted, no matter how vicious or insightful.93 The "list"
was therefore underinclusive, selectively excluding from First
Amendment protection those specifically delineated fighting
words, while seemingly providing protection for others.94 This ap-
proach, Scalia argued, went beyond content-based discrimination
to actual viewpoint discrimination.95 He concluded by stating, "St.
Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queen-
sbury rules." 96
The city's argument that it had a compelling government interest
in protecting against crimes motivated by bias, discrimination and
intolerance was dismissed by the majority as well.97 The city did
not show that its method, the bias-motivated ordinance, was the
least restrictive means available to achieve its desired end.98 The
Court held that, despite the legitimate interest of the city in pro-
tecting its citizens against such intolerance, less restrictive alterna-
tives were available to address the city's interest. 99 Scalia
concluded by stating that the only interest served by the ordinance
was to display the "special hostility" of the City Council "toward
the particular biases ... singled out.1°°
Despite the force of Scalia's argument, and the 9-0 opinion of
the Court, the decision in R.A. V. is far from clear. The concurring
opinions demonstrate the range of rationales and beliefs each jus-
tice holds regarding regulation of bias-motivated expression. Al-
though all agreed that the ordinance was overbroad, each
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See id. Justice Scalia stated:
'[F]ighting words' that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion,
or gender-aspersions upon a person's mother, for example-would seem-
ingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial,
color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speakers'
opponents.
Id.
96. Id. at 392.
97. See id. at 395 (explaining the city's claim that it had a compelling interest in
"ensur[ing] the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically been
subjected to discrimination").
98. See id. at 396 ("An ordinance not limited to the favored topics ... would have
precisely the same beneficial effect.").
99. See id. ("Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in
someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal
to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire.").
100. Id. at 396.
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concurring opinion took sharp turns in their interpretation of First
Amendment law, thereby demonstrating the complexity of the ju-
risprudence in this area and the possibility for attempts at
regulation.
Justice White agreed with the majority that the St. Paul ordi-
nance was "fatally overbroad" and therefore unconstitutional. 10 1
He strongly disagreed, however, with all other points of the deci-
sion. In a scathing criticism, he stated that the majority's reasoning
was "transparently wrong" and had "cast[ I] aside long established
First Amendment doctrine."'01 2 White found it "inexplicable" why
the Court chose this case to "rewrite First Amendment law"'01 3 by
creating its new "underinclusiveness" doctrine that would require a
city to criminalize all fighting words if it wants to criminalize some
fighting words.'"
White also argued that even if the ordinance restricted protected
speech, it was narrowly tailored to serve an important government
interest, and therefore withstood strict scrutiny review.10 5 How-
ever, the majority, in a "second break with precedent"' 0 6 held that
such an ordinance "could never pass Constitutional muster if the
object of that legislation could be accomplished by banning a wider
category of speech.' 0 7 White contended that the majority "offers
no reasoned basis" for this new interpretation,0 8 and that the set-
tled "overbreadth" doctrine was all that was needed to invalidate
the St. Paul ordinance. 10 9
101. Id. at 397 (White, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 398.
103. Id. at 411.
104. Id. at 401-02. White argued that not only did the majority reinvent the law,
but also that its changes detracted from First Amendment jurisprudence. See id. at
402.
Any contribution of this holding to First Amendment jurisprudence is surely
a negative one, since it necessarily signals that expressions of violence, such
as the message of intimidation and racial hatred conveyed by a burning cross
on someone's lawn, are of sufficient value to outweigh the social interest in
order and morality that has traditionally placed such fighting words outside
the First Amendment.
Id.
105. See id. at 403 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 404.
108. Id. at 406.
109. See id. at 413. In explaining this principle, White wrote that "[a]lthough the
ordinance as construed reaches categories of speech that are constitutionally unpro-
tected, it also criminalizes a substantial amount of expression that-however repug-
nant-is shielded by the First Amendment." Id.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens criticized his col-
leagues in the majority as well as in the other concurring opin-
ions.110 He rejected "the allure of absolute principles"1 ' and
called the majority's "revision of the categorical approach ... an
adventure in a doctrinal wonderland."" 12
Stevens contended that the majority's "new absolutism" in
prohibiting content-based regulations was troubling: "Within a
particular 'proscribable' category of expression, the Court holds, a
government must either proscribe all speech or no speech at all.""' 3
He argued that content-based regulations are "inevitable" and are
consistently upheld by the Court." 4 Were it not overbroad, Ste-
vens would uphold the statute, and presumably, narrowly drawn
speech regulations." 5
Blackmun filed a brief concurrence to express his fear about the
future: "I regret what the Court has done in this case. The major-
ity opinion signals one of two possibilities: It will serve as prece-
dent for future cases, or it will not. Either result is
disheartening. 11 6 Blackmun was concerned that if R.A.V. serves
as precedent, the result will be an abandonment of the categorical
110. See id. at 417 (Stevens J., concurring).
111. Id. Instead of an absolute categorical approach, Stevens presented a multi-
factor approach to be considered in determining the validity of a content-based regu-
lation. See id. at 429. First, the scope of protection depends on the "content and
character" of the expression, thereby providing the most protection for political
speech and the least for pornography. Id. Second, the "context" in which the speech
occurs should influence the Court's analysis-whether it was a school environment or
a captive audience, for example. Id. at 429-30. Third, the "scope of the restrictions"
should be significant, considering whether it was narrow or extensive. Id. at 431.
112. Id. at 418.
113. Id. at 419.
114. See id. at 420. Stevens wrote, "our decisions demonstrate that content-based
distinctions, far from being presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable
aspect of a coherent understanding of the First Amendment." Id. He offered this
example:
If Congress can prohibit false advertising directed at airline passengers with-
out also prohibiting false advertising directed at bus passengers and if a city
can prohibit political advertisements in its buses while allowing other adver-
tisements, it is ironic to hold that a city cannot regulate fighting words based
on "race, color, creed, religion or gender" while leaving unregulated fighting
words based on "union membership ... or homosexuality" ... The Court
today turns First Amendment law on its head ....
Id. at 423.
115. See id. at 434. "Conduct that creates special risks or causes special harms may
be prohibited by special rules . . . . There are legitimate, reasonable, and neutral
justifications for such special rules." Id. at 416.
116. Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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approach to regulating speech.117 If the case does not serve as pre-
cedent but is instead regarded as "an aberration-a case where the
Court manipulated doctrine to strike down an ordinance whose
premise it opposed,""' 8 then this result too is "regrettable."" 19
D. Regulating Hate After R.A. V.: Wisconsin v. Mitchell 120
Blackmun's concern over the precedential weight of R.A. V. may
have been answered in the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision Wis-
consin v. Mitchell.12 ' In that case, the Court unanimously upheld a
Wisconsin statute that enhanced the defendant's sentence for ag-
gravated assault 2 2 because he intentionally selected his victim
based on the victim's race.123
Mitchell appealed his conviction on First Amendment
grounds. 24 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the
state's argument that the statute merely prohibited conduct not
speech. The court instead interpreted the statute to be a punish-
117. See id. Blackmun argued that if the Court is "forbidden to categorize" then the
result will be to "reduce protection across the board." Id. "If all expressive activity
must be accorded the same protection, that protection will be scant." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 416. "I fear that the Court has been distracted from its proper mission by
the temptation to decide the issue over 'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diver-
sity,' neither of which is presented here." Id. at 415-16. While he argued that the St.
Paul ordinance was constitutionally overbroad, Blackmun concluded that he saw "no
First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that prohibits hoodlums from
driving minorities out of their homes by burning crosses on their lawns." Id. at 416.
The harm, he contended, was in "preventing the people of St. Paul" from "punishing
the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their community." Id.
120. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 480. The defendant, along with a group of young black men, severely
beat a white boy, rendering him unconscious and comatose for four days. The men
were allegedly inspired by a scene in the movie "Mississippi Burning" in which a
similar incident was portrayed. After viewing the movie, the defendant asked the
others, "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people?" and then immedi-
ately before the incident, "You all want to fluck somebody up?" Id. (citing Brief of
Petitioner at 4-5).
123. See id. Under Wisconsin law, the maximum penalty for an offense is enhanced
whenever the defendant "[i]ntentionally selects the person against whom the crime
... is committed ... because of the... race, religion, color, disability, sexual orienta-
tion, national origin or ancestry of that person . . . ." Id. (citing Wis. STAT.
§ 939.645(1)(b) (1999).
124. See id. at 485 ("Because the only reason for the enhancement is the defen-
dant's discriminatory motive for selecting his victim, Mitchell argues (and the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court held) that the statute violates the First Amendment by punishing
offenders' bigoted beliefs.").
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ment of the underlying bigoted thought. 125 The court also found
the statute unconstitutionally overbroad because conviction would
require "evidence of the defendant's prior speech," which it rea-
soned would have a "'chilling effect' on those who feared the pos-
sibility of prosecution for offenses subject to penalty
enhancement. " 1 2 6
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, l2 7 dismissing the
First Amendment claims by finding that the statute punished con-
duct, not speech. 128 The Court emphasized that "the Constitution
does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence con-
cerning one's belief and associations at sentencing simply because
those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amend-
ment.' 29 The Court then dismissed the overbreadth claim by stat-
ing that "this is simply too speculative a hypothesis."' 3 °
We must conjure up a vision of a Wisconsin citizen suppressing
his unpopular bigoted opinions for fear that if he later commits
an offense covered by the statute, these opinions will be offered
at trial to establish that he selected his victim on account of the
victim's protected status, thus qualifying him for penalty
enhancement.13 '
The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court.132
In its decision, the Court distinguished Mitchell from R.A.V.,
reasoning that, while the ordinance in R.A.V. was directed at ex-
pression, the statute in Mitchell was aimed at conduct, which the
First Amendment does not protect. 133 It characterized such con-
125. See id. at 482 (arguing that the statute punished offensive thought and the
reasoning behind the defendant's actions, rather than the action itself and citing
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 482-83. The Court pointed out that it granted certiorari to resolve
the conflicting authority of high state courts on the constitutionality of penalty en-
hancement statutes that have been enacted all over the country.
128. See id. at 484 ("[A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.").
129. Id. at 486 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992)). The Court argued
that the state's interest in preventing bias-motivated crimes is adequately justified by
the legislature's lengthy evidence regarding the extensive harm this kind of conduct
has on society, and is clearly not done so merely because of the disagreeableness of
the speaker's beliefs. See id.
130. Id. at 489.
131. Id. at 488-89.
132. See id. at 490.
133. See id. at 487.
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duct as "bias-inspired" and argued that the state could single it out
due to its potentially grave harm to society.134
The Court may have concluded that the cases were easily distin-
guishable, but critics assert that the result in Mitchell may signal a
departure from Scalia's reasoning in R.A.V. and be an attempt to
correct or amend its previous result.135 Therefore, an argument
can still be sustained in support of narrow regulations of bias-in-
spired expression. "Scalia's simplistic dismissal [of bans on racially
motivated fighting words] was ignored by the court in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell .... Scalia's extreme attack on speech codes has been
effectively overruled.' '136
E. Speech Codes in Light of Caselaw
Pursuant to federal case law and the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in R.A.V., critics contend that the speech code debate at uni-
versities should be dismissed.137  An examination of First
Amendment jurisprudence shows that the Court has permitted a
man to wear a T-shirt with the words "Fuck the Draft" into a
courthouse,'138 a publisher to print violent pornography, 39 a pro-
134. See id. at 487-88.
135. See Aviva 0. Wertheimer, Note, The First Amendment Distinction Between
Conduct and Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting Words
Jurisprudence, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 828 (1994).
When the facts of R.A.V.-a cross burning by a white man on the lawn of a
black family-are placed alongside the facts in Mitchell-the assault of a
white victim by a group of black teenagers-the incompatibility of the
Court's analysis becomes evident. Assaulting a boy because he is white is as
much expression as intimidating an African American family by burning a
cross on their lawn. Similarly, burning a cross to intimidate an African-
American family is as much conduct as assaulting a white boy.
Id.
136. SHIELL, supra note 1, at 110 (quoting JOHN K. WILSON, THE MYT14 OF POLITI-
CAL CORRECTNESS: THE CONSERVATIVE ATTACK ON HIGHER EDUCATION 101
(1995)); see also David E. Rovella, Critics See Threat to Free Speech as States Stiffen
Penalties on Bias-motivated Crime, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 29, 1994, at Al (quoting Law-
rence Tribe's argument that the two cases cannot be reconciled-"They wanted to cut
back what they did in R.A.V.-to put the genie back in the bottle").
137. See generally SHIELL, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining the critics' contentions and
arguing why this debate is far from an open and shut case).
138. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the message on Co-
hen's jacket was protected speech and those who found it offensive could avoid it
simply by averting their eyes).
139. See American Bookseller's Ass'n v. Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (finding that
the interest of free speech outweighed the state's interest in prohibiting sex
discrimination).
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tester to burn the American flag, 140 and a neo-Nazi group to march
in a mostly Jewish neighborhood. 141 The argument is that if courts
will protect such expression, then it will certainly seek to ensure
free and unfettered speech in the public university context.
This argument fails to take several factors into account. 142 It also
fails to carefully examine caselaw to understand just what the
courts have prohibited.143 It is these cases that colleges and univer-
sities nationwide must reexamine when developing a potential pol-
icy on hate speech for their individual campuses. For example,
R.A. V. did not hold that university speech codes were unconstitu-
tional. The case did not even mention speech codes. 144 "This, of
course, does not mean that the Court's First Amendment analysis
is not applicable to public education . . . .but . . . the outcome
might depend on the specific wording of the code. 14 5
The decision in R.A.V. suggests that in developing speech codes,
public universities "should pay special attention to two factors:
content and overbreadth.' 1 46 As to the content, a university code,
like a city ordinance, would be void unless it added a provision that
applied the "code to all students, not just to minorities or other
specific groups.' 1 47 Although the majority in R.A. V. did not strike
down the statute based on overbreadth, the concurring opinions
and the federal court decisions in Doe and UWM-Post demonstrate
that a campus code is not likely to survive if it punishes protected
as well as unprotected speech. 148
Codes that "simply do not tolerate violence and intimidation di-
rected at anyone,... codes built on one-on-one infractions" are
140. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning of the American flag is
expressive conduct shielded by the First Amendment, despite the state's asserted in-
terest in preventing breaches of the peace and preserving the symbol of the nation).
141. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (allowing members of the
National Socialist Party to assemble in uniform, march, and disseminate information,
after finding three village ordinances prohibiting such unconstitutional).
142. See SHIELL, supra note 1, at 9. These factors include political affiliations, be-
liefs and reactions of the judges to the power and pressure of advocacy groups and
public opinion, and the responsive nature of our legal system. See id. "Any serious
student of free speech knows that what was once protected may not be in the future
and what was once unprotected may well become protected at some future point."
Id.
143. See id. at 110 ("There is no constitutional barrier to narrowly written univer-
sity speech codes, even if not all fighting words are punished equally.").
144. See David Schimmel, Are "Hate Speech" Codes Unconstitutional? An Analysis
of R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 76 EDUC. REP. 653, 662 (1992).
145. Id.





more likely to succeed. 149 Also, when members of groups who
have suffered disproportionate harm on campus are harassed or
assaulted, then a Mitchell-based code could feasibly be employed
that would take this bias into account as an aggravating factor in
assessing punishment. 150
II. CONFLICTING IDEALS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HATE
SPEECH CODES
This is not an easy legal or moral puzzle, but it is precisely in
these places where we feel conflicting tugs at heart and mind
that we have the most work to do and the most knowledge to
gain.151
The conflict regarding the regulation of hate speech often pits
the ideals of liberty against those of equality: the call for free and
unfettered speech as afforded by the First Amendment against the
demands for equal opportunity and access as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 15
2
The "civil-rights-versus-civil-liberties"' 53 approach is one way of
framing the issue surrounding the hate speech debate, but some are
wary of a seemingly categorical approach to such a complex con-
troversy. 154 Justice Stevens argues that the two are inextricably in-
tertwined. Expansion in First Amendment doctrine "came about
as a result of the Court's decision that the word 'liberty' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment includes the freedoms protected by
the First Amendment.' 1 55  Under this theory, traditional First
Amendment analysis must inevitably be evaluated from a Due Pro-
149. Valerie L. Brown, J.D., M.A., Hate Speech in Colleges and Universities-The
Aftermath of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 79 EDuc. REP. 697, 707 (1993).
150. See Schimmel, supra note 144, at 664.
151. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 869 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
152. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narra-
tives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 347 (1991) ("One often hears that the prob-
lem of campus antiracism rules is that of balancing free speech and equality.").
153. Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American Civil
Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143 (1994)
[hereinafter "Strossen, Defense"].
154. See id. at 149-53 (arguing that pitting the two ideals in conflict ignores the
inherent link between them: "it is conceptually impossible for a dedicated human
rights advocate even to draw a meaningful distinction between liberty and equality,
let alone to see them as being somehow inalterably in opposition to each other"); see
also Lawrence, supra note 6, at 436 ("I fear that by framing the debate as we have-as
one in which the liberty of free speech is in conflict with the elimination of racism-
we have advanced the cause of racial oppression and have placed the bigot on the
moral high ground, fanning the rising flames of racism.").
155. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1298 (1993).
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cess perspective, "specifically the need to evaluate the legitimacy
and adequacy of a state's interests in abridging speech. 156
As these theories suggest, the conflict may be better analyzed by
avoiding such labels-"speech versus equality." Instead, there
should be an examination of the particular arguments offered by
those who favor speech codes as a necessary and permissible
means of addressing a real societal harm against the arguments of
those who denounce them as a counter-productive, impermissible
violation of the First Amendment.
A. Proponents of Hate Speech Regulations: Furthering First
Amendment Realism
1. The Irreparable Harm of Hate Speech
The ubiquity and incessancy of harmful racial depiction are thus
the source of its virulence. Like water dripping on sandstone, it
is a pervasive harm which only the most hardy can resist. Yet
the prevailing first amendment paradigm predisposes us to treat
racist speech as an individual harm, as though we only had to
evaluate the effect of a single drop of water. This approach...
systematically misperceives the experience of racism for both
victim and perpetrator.15 7
Mari Matsuda, a professor at the School of Law and at the
Center for Asian American Studies at UCLA, was one of the first
to look at the hate speech issue from the point of view that it actu-
ally harms its victims. She is often accredited for bringing an "out-
sider jurisprudence" to the forefront of this debate. 58 Matsuda
explains that victims of hate speech suffer irreparable harm, both
psychologically and physically.' 59 Victims of racist speech internal-
ize the feelings of inferior self-worth and self-hatred. This in turn
affects their relationships with others, their job performance, edu-
cational endeavors, and ultimately their ability to effectively com-
156. Id. at 1301.
157. Delgado, supra note 152, at 384.
158. See Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic-
tim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). The article explains that outsider jurispru-
dence is both "historical and revisionist, attempting to know history from the
bottom," employing non-traditional sources such as, journals, poems, oral histories,
and shared stories and experiences. Id. at 2324.
159. Id. at 2336 ("Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced physiologi-
cal symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut, rapid pulse rate and
difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psy-
chosis, and suicide."). Professor Matsuda cites numerous psychological and psycho-
linguistic studies for her propositions. See id.
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municate. 160 The harm of hate speech, as proponents of codes
contend, is real.
a. Assaultive Speech Lands a Blistering Blow
Those in favor of hate speech regulations argue that the harm of
such speech is the equivalent of a punch - an actual assault on
one's sense of person, essentially having the same effect as physical
violence. 16 1 Like violence, words may land a sharp and insidious
blow to those at whom they are hurled: "The experience of being
called a 'nigger,' 'spic,' 'Jap,' or 'kike' is like receiving a slap in the
face.' 1 62 Regulating such speech is a "pragmatic response to the
urgent needs of students of color and other victims of hate speech
who are daily silenced, intimidated, and subjected to severe psy-
chological and physical trauma by racist assailants who employ
words and symbols as part of an arsenal of weapons of oppression
and subordination.' 163
As if repeated blows to one's psychological well-being by lan-
guage of this sort is not enough, the victim is then further injured
by the "government response of tolerance."' 64 The blows of the
racists, the homophobes or the sexists is then compounded by a
final shot from the government or the university that stands idly by
and accepts the intolerant messages. 65
Those involved in the outsider jurisprudence movement contend
that a message of hate "inflict[s] wounds"' 66 that do not just injure
the intended victim but rather "hit the gut of [all] those in the tar-
get group."' 67 This message-you are different, you are inferior,
you do not belong, you will never amount to anything-is then
160. See id. at 2337.
Victims are restricted in their personal freedom. In order to avoid receiving
hate messages, victims have had to quit jobs, forgo education, leave their
homes, avoid certain public places, curtail their own exercise of speech
rights, and otherwise modify their behavior and demeanor. The recipient of
hate messages struggles with inner turmoil.
Id.
161. See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND 7 (1993); see also Law-
rence, supra note 6, at 462 ("Psychic injury is no less an injury than being struck in the
face, and it often is far more severe.").
162. Lawrence, supra note 6, at 452.
163. MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 161, at 7.
164. Matsuda, supra note 158, at 2338.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 2335.
167. Id. at 2332; see also MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 161, at 8 ("This was injury to
a group. To privatize it ignored the greatest part of the injury.").
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"conveyed on the street, in school yards, in popular culture, and in
the propaganda of hate widely distributed in this country.' 168
b. Tolerance of Hate Speech Perpetuates a Social Reality
of Subordination
Those who call for regulation of hate speech further contend that
in allowing such messages to be conveyed and spread, the govern-
ment is arguably constructing and even perpetuating a damaging
social reality about the affected groups "so that members of that
group are always one down.' 69 All members are harmed, because
"at some level, no matter how much both victims and well-meaning
dominant-group members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in
our minds as an idea that may hold some truth.' x7 0
This dominant social reality harms victims of hate speech in two
ways: (1) externally, in society's perception of such groups; and (2)
internally, in the victim's own perception of himself. The former is
known as the "those people" effect-when one repeatedly hears
that "those people are lazy, dirty, sexualized, money-grubbing, dis-
honest, inscrutable... [w]e reject the idea, but the next time we sit
next to one of 'those people' the dirt message, the sex message, is
triggered. "171
By "[p]ermitting one social group to speak disrespectfully of an-
other habituates and encourages speakers to continue speaking
that way in the future,' ' 7 2 thereby making laws regulating such
speech imperative to ensure that such groups may no longer find
themselves "one down.' ' 7 3 As this way of speaking becomes "nor-
malized" by society, it then becomes "inscribed in hundreds of
plots, narratives, and scripts; it becomes part of culture, what eve-
ryone knows.' '1 74
Not only do such messages cause external or reputational harm
to the group as perceived by society, such ideas often become an
internal reality for victims. Repeated messages of this sort eventu-
168. See Matsuda, supra note 158, at 2232.
169. Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism is Giving Way to First Amend-
ment Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 172 (1994).
170. Matsuda, supra note 158, at 2339.
171. Id. at 2339-40.
172. Richard Delgado & David Yun, "The Speech We Hate": First Amendment To-
talism, The ACLU, and the Principle of Dialogic Politics, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1281, 1296
(1996).
173. Delgado, supra note 169, at 172; see also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 179 (1995) ("[C]ontent-based or even viewpoint-
based restrictions might plausibly been seen as a corrective ... .
174. Delgado & Yun, supra note 172, at 1296-97.
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ally cause victims to believe that perhaps they do not deserve to be
treated as everyone else.175 "Through an unfortunate psychological
mechanism, incessant bombardment by images of [this] sort . . .
inscribe those negative images on the souls and minds of minority
persons. Minorities internalize the stories they read, see and hear
every day. 176
The effect of such internalization silences victims, ingraining
them with the notion that their voice is not valuable or credible in
society's discourse. 17 7 "Who would listen to, who would credit, a
speaker or writer one associates with watermelon-eating, buffoon-
ery, menial work, intellectual inadequacy, laziness, lasciviousness,
and demanding resources beyond his or her adequate share?' '1 78
The result of such silencing is that victims of hate speech have no
effective voice in the marketplace of ideas, 79 leaving them little
opportunity to counter-attack the assaultive speech. 8°
c. Hate Speech Denies Equal Educational Opportunity
[Olur educational institutions [are] idealized as a refuge for the
calm, impartial, and unimpeded pursuit of knowledge and truth.
Here we hope to escape the bigotry, cruelty and injustice
outside. But universities and colleges are no longer, if they ever
were, tranquil havens in a prejudiced world. Instead, for people
of color, women, gays and lesbians, religious minorities, and
members of other arbitrarily disadvantaged groups, institutions
of higher education have become, increasingly, places of physi-
cal and psychological danger.181
Advocates and opponents of hate speech regulation both agree
that the university holds a special place in our society. It is instilled
with a unique mission to pursue knowledge and truth through un-
175. See Matsuda, supra note 158, at 2340.
176. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law
and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systematic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1287 (1992).
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. For a discussion of the marketplace of ideas philosophy see infra note 209 and
accompanying text.
180. See id. at 1287 ("The expense of speech also precludes the stigmatized from
participating effectively in the marketplace of ideas."). For a more extensive discus-
sion of the failure of the "more speech" argument in the area of hate speech, see infra
Part II.A.2.a.
181. Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal
Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 119, 122-23 (1991).
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fettered discourse. 82 At the same time, the university must pro-
mote the ideals of equality and tolerance as well as ensure that all
students have the same access to pursue their educational goals. 183
Those in favor of regulation argue that when messages of hate are
expressed and then tolerated at a university the victims are essen-
tially denied an equal opportunity to learn.' 84
Speech code advocates contend that what makes the university a
special place is that it brings people of various backgrounds, reli-
gions, economic statuses and ethnicities into a self-contained com-
munity and seeks to give each one of them the same opportunity to
achieve and succeed. 185 Students depend on this sense of commu-
nity and equality for intellectual development.' 86
The tolerance of racist, sexist or homophobic speech at a univer-
sity destroys "the goals of inclusion, education, development of
knowledge, and ethics that universities exist and stand for.'1 87 Ad-
vocates assert that a university cannot educate its students on the
ideals of tolerance, equality and acceptance of difference when its
inaction sends a message that such ideals are not significant enough
to be vigilantly protected by the administration. 88
Without the protection of the university system, victims are left
with a means of self-regulation, which places an undue burden on
"vulnerable members of our society, such as isolated, young black
undergraduates attending dominantly white campuses.' 1 89 Hate
speech is therefore "harmful to targets" in this setting, because
they "perceive the university as taking sides through inaction" and
leaving students "to their own resources in coping with the damage
wrought." 190 Such a burden takes attention, focus and energy away
from their academic pursuits.
Speech code proponents argue that the content-based aspect of
speech codes raises no significant issue, because "controlling
182. See generally Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression:
The Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351
(1990) (outlining the hate speech code debate in the university setting).
183. See generally id.
184. See generally Matsuda, supra note 158, at 2370-71.
185. See id. at 2370 ("Universities are special places, charged with pedagogy, and
duty-bound to a constituency with special vulnerabilities.").
186. See id. at 2370-71.
187. Id.
188. See SHIELL, supra note 1, at 48 ("A university can live up to this promise by
enacting a hate speech code, for even if a code is rarely enforced, its symbolic message
is that minorities are welcome and their interests will be protected.").
189. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 176, at 1286.
190. Matsuda, supra note 158, at 2371.
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speech is ... a defining characteristic of the university.' 191 Support
for this argument is evidenced by subject matter restrictions in cur-
riculum, viewpoint discrimination in admissions, faculty tenure de-
cisions, grading, and the recognized need to ensure civility in
academic discourse that would not be necessary on a street
corner.
192
2. Carefully Drafted Hate Speech Codes are in Accord with First
Amendment Jurisprudence
a. Hate Speech as Fighting Words
The "fighting words" doctrine was first articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.193 The Court
held that such words-those that "inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace"-are unprotected by the First
Amendment.194 Fighting words, Justice Murphy wrote, "are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.' '1 95
The doctrine, as first set out in Chaplinsky, has been weakened
by later caselaw. Fighting words that merely insult or injure are no
longer unprotected by the First Amendment.196 The second prong,
words that "tend to cause an immediate breach of the peace," is
191. SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 199.
192. See id. at 199-200. Sunstein suggests various ways in which a university en-
gages in content and viewpoint-based regulations, but cautions that "[tihese examples
do not by any means compel the conclusion that any and all censorship is acceptable
in an academic setting." Id. at 201.
193. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, appellant was convicted of violating a
New Hampshire law "prohibiting the addressing of any derisive or annoying word to
any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, or calling him by
any offensive or derisive name." Id. at 568.
194. Id. at 572. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include... 'fighting' words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 571-
72.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson 405 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1972) (holding a Georgia
statute prohibiting abusive language to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on
its face); Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (reversing the convic-
tion of petitioner whose speech allegedly stirred people to anger and invited public
dispute); City of Houston v. Hill 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987) (finding a city ordinance
which made it illegal to abuse or disturb a police officer overbroad, as it did not limit
its reach to the fighting words exception).
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now the emphasis of the doctrine.197 "Accordingly, under the pre-
sent doctrine, speech must be: (1) an extremely provocative per-
sonal insult; (2) addressed to an individual; (3) in a face-to-face
encounter; (4) tending to cause an immediate violent reaction; and
(5) tending to cause a breach of peace by an average hearer.' 1 98
Such a narrowing of the fighting words doctrine impacts strongly
on a university's ability to regulate hate speech under this
theory. 199
In spite of this narrowing, speech code proponents argue that
hate speech in the form of face-to-face insults can appropriately be
regulated as fighting words.2" Charles R. Lawrence III, Professor
of Law at Georgetown University and frequent author on topics
such as hate speech, racism and discrimination, asserts that it is
permissible to hold such speech as undeserving of protection for
two reasons: first, the impact of such speech is immediate and
therefore presents no time for reflection or response; second, the
purpose of the First Amendment is to encourage more speech and
the silencing effect of racist invectives work counter to this princi-
ple.2 °' Sanctioning such speech does not enable truth to reach the
marketplace, because the speaker's intention is to silence and in-
jure the victim. 202
The argument that hate speech can be viewed as a form of "ver-
bal aggression" or as fighting words is grounded in the premise that
"speech of this sort, which seeks to abuse or dominate others on a
197. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
198. Melanie A. Moore, Note, Free Speech on College Campuses: Protecting the
First Amendment in the Marketplace of Ideas, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 511, 523 (1993).
199. See id. ("[U]niversity speech codes that prohibit students from using abusive
language that merely 'annoys' other students will be held unconstitutional.").
200. See Lawrence, supra note 6, at 451 ("When racist speech takes the form of
face-to-face insults, catcalls, or other assaultive speech aimed at an individual or small
group of persons, then it falls within the 'fighting words' exception to first amendment
protection."). But see Matsuda, supra note 158, at 2357 (arguing that stretching "ex-
isting first amendment exceptions, such as the 'fighting words' doctrine ... weakens
the first amendment fabric"). Hate speech
is best treated as a sui generis category, presenting an idea so historically
untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degra-
dation of the very classes of human beings who are least equipped to re-
spond that it is properly treated as outside the realm of protected discourse.
Id.
201. See Lawrence, supra note 6, at 452.
202. See id. ("Assaultive racist speech functions as a preemptive strike. The racial
invective is experienced as a blow, not a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it
is unlikely that dialogue will follow.").
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visceral level, often leads to violence. ' 2°3 Therefore, hate speech
may be constitutionally regulated under the fighting words doc-
trine because it does not merely annoy or insult, rather it is likely
to invoke a violent reaction.2 °4 Because of the violent "blow"
struck by such speech, the victim has no time to reflect on the idea
expressed and rationally or reasonably respond to it.
20 5
The second argument made by Lawrence is a direct response to
opponents who argue that more speech, not less, is the best cure
for hate speech's harm.20 6 Just as the attack of hate speech engen-
ders violence, over time such messages suppress and silence the
victims so that they cannot effectively respond to their assailants.20 7
"When one is personally attacked with words that denote one's
subhuman status and untouchability, there is little (if anything)
that can be said to redress either the emotional or reputational
injury. "208
Such an effect inhibits truth and diverse ideas from circulating in
the marketplace, and this runs contrary to the principles espoused
by the First Amendment.20 9 Without a voice in such a system, vic-
tims of hate speech therefore cannot effectively talk back, because
even if they did, no one would listen.210 The reality of most situa-
203. Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1371 (1998).
204. See id. at 1372 ("[V]erbal aggression tends to initiate an escalating cycle of
hostilities that may swiftly culminate in violence.").
205. See Lawrence, supra note 6, at 452.
206. See id.; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
207. See MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 161, at 13 ("In the absence of theory and
analysis that give them a diagnosis and a name for the injury they have suffered, they
internalize the injury done them and are rendered silent in the face of continuing
injury.").
208. Lawrence, supra note 6, at 453.
209. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984
DUKE L.J. 1 (1984). The concept of the marketplace of ideas was first introduced by
Justice Holmes in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
The "theory assumes that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited by governmental
interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best perspective or
solutions for societal problems," thus ensuring "the proper evolution of society." See
Ingber, supra, at 3; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 179 ("The marketplace of
ideas is of course a function of existing law, including property law, which is responsi-
ble for the allocation of entitlements that can be made into speech. The resulting
system is hardly without unjustified inequality.").
210. See Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Essay II. Pressure Valves and Bloodied
Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 871, 883-84 (1994).
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tions is that talking back may actually place the victim in more
danger.21'
b. The Ban on Content-Based Regulations and Viewpoint
Discrimination: Not So Absolute
Those who argue that hate speech codes can be enacted within
the parameters of constitutional law face significant hurdles under
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Marshall
wrote, "Above all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content. ' 212 More recently, in
R.A.V., Scalia stated that "content-based regulations are presump-
tively invalid. 21 3
However, even Justice Stevens has argued "[t]hat the Court rou-
tinely departs from the purported rule against content regulation"
and that Marshall's oft-quoted passage is more properly described
as a "goal or an ideal" than a "proposition of law. ' 214 In his con-
currence in R.A.V., Stevens offered this example:
Threatening someone because of her race or religious beliefs
may cause particularly severe trauma or touch off a riot, and
threatening a high public official may cause substantial social
disruption; such threats may be punished more severely than
threats against someone based on, say, his support of a particu-
lar athletic team. There are legitimate, reasonable, and neutral
justifications for such special rules.21 5
The Court arguably makes much of its distinctions and decisions
based on content.216
In the past, the Court has held that a city law permitting com-
mercial advertising, but not political advertising, on city buses is
211. See id. at 885.
The idea that talking back is safe for the victim or potentially educative for
the racist simply does not correspond with reality. It ignores the power di-
mension to racist remarks, forces minorities to run very real risks, and treats
a hateful attempt to force the victim outside the human community as an
invitation for discussion.
Id.
212. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
213. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
214. Stevens, supra note 155, at 1304; see also Gale, supra note 181, at 144-45 ("The
[F]irst [A]mendment, as construed (and constructed) by the Court, permits the gov-
ernment to ban or restrict a wide variety of expression because of its content or its
viewpoint ... no one seriously argues that the [F]irst [A]mendment means that any-
one anywhere can say absolutely anything.").
215. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
216. See id. at 421.
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constitutional;217 that the Government may regulate airline adver-
tising, but not bus advertising; 218 that the Court may limit cigarette
advertising, but not cigar;219 and that restrictions on the broadcast-
ing of indecent words on the radio may be constitutionally permis-
sible.220 "All of these cases involved the selective regulation of
speech based on content-precisely the sort of regulation the
Court invalidates [in R.A.V.]. ' 221
It is frequently stated that the government also is not free to
regulate speech based on the speaker's viewpoint.222 Justice Scalia
emphasized this principle in R.A.V., where he used the following
example to demonstrate the viewpoint discriminatory effect of the
St. Paul ordinance: "One could hold up a sign, for example, that all
'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all papists are,
for that would insult and provoke violence 'on the basis of relig-
ion. 221 Scalia concluded that such an effect gave one side a clear
advantage over another depending on what views they were
espousing.224
A ban on viewpoint discrimination, however, is not as absolute
as critics contend. In fact, laws in the past have been upheld though
they discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.225 For example, in the
areas of commercial speech, the government forbids advertising in
favor of cigarette smoking even though it does not forbid advertis-
ing against cigarette smoking.226 The same is true regarding alco-
hol advertising.227 Also, in the area of securities law and the
regulating of proxy statements, favorable comments about a com-
pany may be banned while unfavorable ones are allowed or even
encouraged.228
A regulation on hate speech could conceivably overcome the
presumption of invalidity based on viewpoint if "(a) there is at
most a small risk of illegitimate motivation, (b) low value or unpro-
tected speech is at issue, (c) the skewing effect on the system of
217. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
218. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
219. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (current through Oct. 19, 1999).
220. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion).
221. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 422.
222. See, e.g., id. at 391.
223. Id. at 391-92.
224. See id. at 392.
225. See Cass R. Sunstein, Half-Truths of the First Amendment, 1993 U. CHI. LE-
GAL F. 25, 29 (1993).
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free expression is minimal, and (d) the government is able to make
a powerful showing of harm. 229 In drafting a campus code, a uni-
versity could arguably prove that hate speech is of low value and
that its harm is great. Although a university's motivation may be
less suspect than the city council's in R.A.V., the effect on free ex-
pression is still a hurdle a university would have to overcome.
Given the ambiguity of First Amendment jurisprudence, propo-
nents of hate speech restrictions ask "why can we not mark off
boundaries between prohibited racist and sexist harassment and
permissible, though racist or sexist, self-expression or intellectual
inquiry? '231 Matsuda succinctly stated, "If the harm of racist hate
messages is significant, and the truth value marginal, the doctrinal
space for regulation of such speech is a possibility. 2 31 This possi-
bility, however, faces much criticism from First Amendment
absolutists.
B. Critics of Hate Speech Codes: Protecting First
Amendment Formalism
Critics of hate speech codes argue that previously drafted regula-
tions, such as the Michigan Policy and the UW Rule, are problem-
atic for three reasons. First, such attempts are impermissibly vague
in that they do not indicate clearly the limitations placed on stu-
dents.232 Second, they are underinclusive; forbidding speech about
certain topics but not others essentially amounts to favoring one
view over another.233 Third, such regulations are fatally overbroad
in that they often sweep protected as well as unprotected speech
within their reach.234 These restrictions on expression run counter
to the bedrock principle of the First Amendment, namely that
more speech, not less, is the way to ensure that truth reaches the
marketplace of ideas.235 Nowhere is this idea more cherished, crit-
ics argue, than in the university setting.236
1. Vagueness
A statute is considered unconstitutional due to vagueness when
"men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
229. Id. at 29-30.
230. Gale, supra note 181, at 145.
231. Matsuda, supra note 158, at 2341.
232. See infra Part II.B.1.
233. See infra Part II.B.2.
234. See infra Part II.B.3.
235. See infra Part II.B.4.
236. See infra Part II.B.5.
1854
RE-EXAMINING HATE SPEECH
ing. '237 One cannot be expected to be punished for conduct that is
not clearly prohibited in plain language so that there can be no
mistaking its meaning.238 The speech codes at both Michigan and
Wisconsin were struck down based on vagueness, and opponents of
speech codes embrace the court decisions.
The Doe court wrote, "Looking at the plain language of the Pol-
icy, it was simply impossible to discern any limitation on its scope
or any conceptual distinction between protected and unprotected
conduct. ' 239 Words in the code, such as "stigmatize" or "victimize"
did not have any "precise definition," nor was it clear what consti-
tuted a "'threat' to an individual's academic efforts. '240 As a re-
sult, "students of common understanding were necessarily forced
to guess at whether a comment about a controversial issue would
later be found to be sanctionable under the [Michigan] Policy,"
thereby making enforcement of the Policy a violation of due
process.241
2. Underinclusiveness Leads to Viewpoint Discrimination
Based on the doctrine of underbreadth, laws that are too nar-
rowly tailored may meet constitutional challenges.242 The original
concern for underinclusion stemmed from an equal protection
idea, but it has gained prominence in the area of First Amendment
law, particularly under Scalia's opinion in R.A. V.243 A law is con-
sidered underinclusive "when [it] targets some conduct or actors
for adverse treatment, yet leaves untouched conduct or actors that
are indistinguishable in terms of the law's purpose. ' 244 Opponents
of hate speech regulations argue that this underinclusion is a fatal
flaw in the concept of codes.245
237. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citing
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973)).
238. See id.
239. Id. at 867.
240. Id.; see also UMW Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1180 (E.D.
Wis. 1991) ("[T]he UW Rule is unduly vague because it is ambiguous as to whether
the regulated speech must actually demean the listener and create an intimidating,
hostile or demeaning environment for education or whether the speaker must merely
intend to demean the listener and create such an environment.").
241. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
242. See William E. Lee, The First Amendment Doctrine of Underbreadth, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1993).
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)
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The underbreadth doctrine was employed by the majority to
strike down the St. Paul hate speech ordinance in R.A.V., because
the statute proscribed only those fighting words addressing race,
color, creed, religion and gender.24 6 "Those who wish to use 'fight-
ing words' in connection with other ideas-to express hostility, for
example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality-are not covered." '247
The Court argued that the City was not permitted to pick and
choose which fighting words were permissible and which were
not.24 8 The effect of such underinclusiveness essentially amounted
to viewpoint discrimination.249 In effect, expressions of racism or
sexism, for example, would be prohibited across the board, but
fighting words that do not concern one of the proscribed topics
"would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those ar-
guing in favor of racial, color, etc. tolerance and equality, but could
not be used by those speakers' opponents. 250 Alan Charles Kors, a
historian at the University of Pennsylvania, has criticized speech
codes for much the same reason, and has noted, "You may say any-
thing you wish at most American universities about whites, males,
heterosexuals, Catholics, Jews as Israelis, or Jews as white Ameri-
cans, members of the Unification church, evangelical Protestants,
and, offend them as you will .... You may not offend militant
blacks, politicized Hispanics, radical feminists, or activist gays."'251
Critics are wary of such ad hoc determinations of which groups
deserve protection and which do not.
3. Overbreadth: Codes Cover More than Mere Fighting Words
Another argument offered by critics of hate speech codes is that
the proposals are consistently overbroad and therefore unconstitu-
tional. "[T]he state may not prohibit broad classes of speech, some
of which may indeed be legitimately regulable, if in so doing a sub-
stantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct is also pro-





250. Id. But see supra Part I.C.3. in which the concurring justices argue against the
underbreadth doctrine as applied by the majority.
251. SHIELL, supra note 1, at 62 (quoting Alan Charles Kors, Harassment Policies in
the University, Society 28, no. 4 (1991)).
252. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 864 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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that the statutes be narrowly tailored to address a compelling
harm.2
53
According to the Court, overbreadth analysis is "strong
medicine" and may be used to strike down a statute "only when
the overbreadth of the statute is not only 'real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep. ' '254 However, in Doe, UWM Post and R.A.V., the courts
found that the hate speech regulations were not capable of a nar-
rower interpretation and were facially overbroad. All the concur-
ring justices in R.A. V. agreed upon this one point of contention.255
Justice White, for example, wrote that "[a]lthough the ordinance as
construed reaches categories of speech that are constitutionally un-
protected, it also criminalizes a substantial amount of expression
that-however repugnant-is shielded by the First Amendment
.... [T]he ordinance is therefore fatally overbroad and invalid on
its face. 256
The overbreadth doctrine is a powerful argument to be consid-
ered in drafting hate speech codes. If the language of the code is
not carefully and narrowly framed, protected speech is inevitably
going to be punished, as the ordinance in R.A. V. did with language
like arouses "anger, alarm or resentment. '257 The Court argued
that the "mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, of-
fense, or resentment does not render the expression unpro-
tected. '258 R.A.V. demonstrates that each word must be chosen
carefully, so as not to sweep too broadly into constitutionally pro-
tected areas.
4. More Speech, Not Less, is the Best Way to Combat Hate
One of the primary arguments made by opponents of hate
speech regulation is that the U.S. Constitution does not provide for
curtailment of speech simply because some people find it "bad" or
"hurtful. ' 259 Laurence Tribe, author of a hornbook on Constitu-
253. See id.
254. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 411 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
255. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 411.
256. Id. at 413-14.
257. Id. at 414.
258. Id. (citations omitted).
259. See, e.g., Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1, 21 (1991) ("I have no doubt that racist and sexist insults and epithets harm
the listener, and harm society. But in the final analysis, if harm to the listener is the
measure by which we regulate speech, there will be nothing left of the First Amend-
ment."); see also United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 644-45 (1929) (Holmes,
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tional law, writes, "If the Constitution forces government to allow
people to march, speak, and write in favor of peace, brotherhood
and justice, then it must also require government to allow them to
advocate hatred, racism, and even genocide. ''260
This argument is supported by the notion that it is difficult, even
dangerous, to attempt to define exactly which speech causes
harm261 or to determine how speech will affect each individual.262
Therefore, by advocating more speech, instead of labeling certain
speech impermissible, our Constitution ensures a neutral market-
place of ideas. Truth can only be reached by discourse.263 "Because
we cannot be certain as to what concepts advance or demean
human autonomy, we permit vigorous debate," thereby promoting
"the pursuit of truth. 264
Free expression has historically been the greatest ally of the dis-
advantaged, discriminated and downtrodden.265 Speech has al-
lowed doors to open for such groups, which is why critics of codes
are wary of closing them through such restrictions.266 As Benjamin
L. Hooks, former Executive Director of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, wrote, "The civil rights
movement would have been vastly different without the shield and
spear of the First Amendment. The Bill of Rights ... is of particu-
J., dissenting) ("[I]f there is any principle in the Constitution that more imperatively
calls for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free thought - not free
thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.").
260. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 838 n.17
(2d ed. 1988).
. 261. See Wolfson, supra note 259, at 21 ("If we deed to government the power to
define what is harmful, and to censor speech that, in its opinion, will cause harm, we
open the way to government thought control."). But see Delgado & Yun, supra note
172 (explaining the weakness in the "speech we hate" argument).
262. See Benjamin Bayer, Lawrence U: Today's Corrupt Philosophy Causes Cen-
sorship, THE LAWRENTIAN, May 11, 1998 (arguing that "no objective standard of what
constitutes 'harm' is ever presented," thereby destroying free speech "since just about
anything a person can say or do may harm someone else-in some sense"); see also
Wolfson, supra note 259, at 23 ("People differ radically in their definitions of what is
racist or sexist.").
263. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 209. See also Andrew Sullivan, What's so Bad
About Hate, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 26, 1999, at 50. Sullivan argues that the "bound-
aries between hate and prejudice and between prejudice and opinion and between
opinion and truth are so complicated and blurred" that to ban such discourse or to fit
it into some contrived legal box is a "doomed and illiberal venture." Id. at 112.
264. Wolfson, supra note 259, at 11.
265. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Propo-




lar importance to those who have been the victims of
oppression. 2
67
Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), argues that it is censorship that has historically
silenced minorities and free speech that has liberated them: "Cen-
sorship traditionally has been the tool of people who seek to
subordinate minorities, not those who seek to liberate them. 268
The guarantees of the First Amendment have furthered the civil
rights movement and the women's movement, thereby demonstrat-
ing the "symbiotic interrelationship between free speech and
equality. "269
5. The Academic Environment Should Educate, Not Silence
Critics of hate speech codes argue that the university is also a
special place in that nowhere else is freedom of thought and opin-
ion as cherished. With that in mind, they contend that speech
codes hinder rather than help the educational mission by providing
an artificial environment where notions of "good" and "bad" ideas
are dictated by the administration and not through communication
among students. 1 The result is a chill on free speech, shackling
unfettered discourse in an environment long cherished for promot-
ing such lofty goals.272
Critics further maintain that the carefully scrutinized "good in-
tentions" of speech code advocates fail to provide a remedy for the
intolerance felt by a minority college student.273 Such regulations
have the opposite effect by furthering notions of victimization, in-
267. Id. at 181 (quoting Benjamin L. Hooks).
268. Id. at 232.
269. Id. at 233.
270. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Note, Racist Speech, The First Amendment, and
Public Universities: Taking a Stand on Neutrality, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 564
(1991) (arguing that universities must be allowed wide latitude in promoting open and
robust debate in order to ensure the free exchange of ideas).
271. See Siegel, supra note 182, at 1399-00 ("Students do not fully benefit from
their college years unless classes and classmates expose their assumptions and chal-
lenge their preconceptions .... A university primarily concerned with providing an
environment guaranteed to be agreeable for everyone at all times offers its students
comfort, but at the expense of true education.").
272. See SHIELL, supra note 1, at 64 ("This happens, even if the code does not
restrict constitutionally protected speech, because students and faculty are afraid of
being accused of hate speech and limit their comments to politically safe truisms or
simply don't comment at all on important social issues.").
273. See generally Siegel, supra note 182 (demonstrating that the costs of hate
speech codes weigh heavier than the benefits to a student).
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feriority and weakness by singling out specific groups for special
protection. 74
Implicit in such measures is the notion that minorities must de-
pend on the State for assistance rather than empowering them-
selves to take action.275 "Many minorities ... view such codes as
condescending in their portrayal of minorities as helpless victims of
words. 2 7 6 The codes create special sensitivity towards certain
groups and will likely increase an incoming student's "sense of re-
jection" before he even sets foot on campus.2 77
Both proponents and critics of hate speech codes offer persua-
sive arguments in favor of their positions, but rather than foster
change, this battle perpetuates the universities' inaction. There is
some common ground from which a solution can be found by look-
ing to established U.S. Supreme Court cases in related matters. 8
Il. FIGHTING HATE ON DIFFERENT FRONTS: NARROWING THE
PATH TO A COMMON END
New times demand new measures and new men;
The world advances, and in time outgrows
The laws which in our father's day were best;
And doubtless, after us, some purer scheme
Will be shaped out by wiser men than we,
Made wiser by the steady growth of truth.279
In examining the debate surrounding hate speech regulations, it
appears that the two sides stand on opposite precipices. On one
side, hate speech harms and must be restricted, especially on col-
lege campuses. On the other, free speech is fundamental and can-
not be compromised, especially on college campuses. Although
this rift appears to be insurmountable, in reality the two sides are
not so far apart.
274. See id. at 1400 ("By creating classes of people who require special respect, the
existing policies foster an inegalitarian disciplinary system at an institution that oper-
ates essentially as a meritocracy.").
275. See SHIELL, supra note 1, at 69.
276. Id.; see also GATES ET AL., supra note 265, at 181 (quoting Alan Keyes, who
stated "The basic problem with all these regimes to protect various people is that the
protection incapacitates .... To think that I [as a black man] will ... be told that
white folks have the moral character to shrug off insults, and I do not .... That is the
most insidious, the most insulting, the most racist statement of all!").
277. Robert F. Nagel, Progressive Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Campus
Hate Codes, 64 U. COL. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1993).
278. See infra Part III.A.1-2.
279. LAURA J. LEDERER & RICHARD DELGADO, THE PRICE WE PAY 191 (1995)
(quoting James Russell Lowell, "A Glance Behind the Curtain").
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There is, as with most conflicts, a middle ground where the rift
may be mended if a delicate balance can be reached. Ultimately,
both sides would concede that an educational environment should
provide an opportunity for its students to learn, to exchange ideas
and to grow as individuals. A narrow path towards ensuring this
common end is both possible and permissible by taking certain as-
pects of each side into account and reaching a suitable
compromise.
A. Discriminatory Harassment Directed at Specific Individuals
Creates a Hostile Environment on College Campuses
and is Antithetical to the University Mission
Absent the absolutists, most civil libertarians will concede that
some narrowly drafted hate speech codes are possible, even argua-
bly necessary, on college campuses.28 ° Nadine Strossen, a self-de-
scribed "free speech purist," recognized that restrictions on speech
may be permissible when faced with a "countervailing goal of com-
pelling importance, such as preventing violence. ' 281 The policy of
the ACLU provides for this necessity by "not prohibit[ing] colleges
and universities from enacting disciplinary codes aimed at restrict-
ing acts of harassment, intimidation and invasion of privacy. The
fact that words may be used in connection with otherwise actiona-
ble conduct does not immunize such conduct from appropriate
regulation. "282
In the search for solutions to the hate debate the question is ar-
guably not whether hate speech can be regulated on campus, but
when and under what circumstances.283 This Note argues that it
can be regulated in situations where the speech rises to the level of
discriminatory harassment, the assaultive speech is intentionally di-
rected at an individual in a one-on-one encounter, and effectively
denies that individual an equal opportunity to learn. There is, as
critics of codes contest, great danger in regulating speech on cam-
pus, which is why this proposal is narrow and seeks to restrict
speech as little as possible while still attempting to ensure all stu-
dents their inherent rights of "equal voice, equal liberty, and equal
education. "284
280. See Strossen, Defense, supra note 153, at 153.
281. Id.
282. Id. (quoting ACLU Policy Guide, Policy 72(a) (1993)).
283. See id. at 152-53 ("In truth, the only argument between free speech absolutists
and others is not over whether speech can be regulated, but only over when it can be
regulated.").
284. Gale, supra note 181, at 173.
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1. An Educational Environment Free of Discrimination: A Title
VII Workplace Model on Campus
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." '285 The U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the scope of this "abusive work environment" action in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,286 in which a woman sued her for-
mer employer for his sexist and insulting remarks on the job. 87
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
found for the defendant, asserting that the conduct did not "seri-
ous[ly] affect the plaintiff's well-being" or cause her to "suffer in-
jury.''2 8 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, arguing that the
standard under Title VII is not one requiring psychological injury;
it is enough that the conduct is severe and pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile environment.289 The theory is that,
even if no psychological injury is documented, a discriminatorily
abusive work environment "can and often will detract from em-
ployees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining
on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. "290
285. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999).
286. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
287. See id. at 19. During Harris' employment at Forklift, her supervisor told her
on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, "You're a woman, what do
you know" and that she was "a dumb ass woman." Id. He made sexual innuendos
about discussing her compensation, stating that the two of them should "go to the
Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise." Id. Hardy asked female employees to get
coins from his front pocket and had Harris and other woman pick objects up off the
floor in front of him that he intentionally threw there. See id.
288. Id. at 20 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986)). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court. See id.
289. Id. at 22 ("So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is
perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically
injurious."). The court points out that this "is not a mathematically precise test" and
can "only be determined by looking at all the circumstances." Id. at 22-23. Such fac-
tors to be taken into account include the frequency and severity of the conduct, and
whether it threatens, humiliates, or "unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." Id. at 23.
290. See id. at 21-22 ("[Elven without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact
that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national
origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.").
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Title VII and IX of the Civil Rights Act embody the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equality291 and seek to prevent dis-
crimination in the workplace and in education by forbidding the
denial of a person's equal opportunity to participate and achieve.
Some hate speech on college campuses rises to the level of verbal
harassment, intimidation and discrimination, which deprives the
victims of an equal educational opportunity. Therefore, strong jus-
tification exists for hostile environment based speech codes in the
university setting.292
The workplace and the university setting are sufficiently similar
to warrant the application of the workplace model in the university
environment. Any differences between the two are "in degree
more than [in] kind. ' 293 The essential purpose behind each institu-
tion, the workplace or the university, is to ensure an environment
that is conducive to equal productivity, equal thought, and equal
opportunity to achieve. The two have many similar characteristics:
The classroom, the lab, the dorm, the dining hall, and the like
are all places in which students must live and work and perform
successfully if they are not to be denied tangible future benefits,
in just the same way that the workplace is a place in which em-
ployees must live and work and perform successfully if they are
not to be denied tangible future benefits.294
The two environments are analogous in several other respects.
First, in both an employment setting and on a college campus the
employee and the student generally interact with the same people
on a regular basis, whether it be in meetings, classes, or social
events.295 Second, in both of these contexts the participants share
individual goals-success, promotion, academic achievement-and
community goals-productivity, recognition, winning.296  Third,
both employees and students have limited avenues of retreat in the
face of harassing speech, and are therefore a captive audience.297
291. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1999); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1999) ("No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
292. See generally SHIELL, supra note 1, at 99 (outlining the argument in favor of
applying a Title VII approach in the university setting); see also Gale, supra note 181,
at 174.
293. Ellen E. Lange, Note, Racist Speech on Campus: A Title VII Solution to a First
Amendment Problem, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 125 (1990).
294. SHEILL, supra note 1, at 107.
295. See Lange supra note 293, at 125-26.
296. See id. at 126.
297. See id.
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Finally, the "risk of overintrusiveness [in these contexts] is limited
by the nature of the setting" because "both the workplace and the
campus are discrete, definable 'experiences.' "298 With such defi-
nite boundaries, rules may be tailored to specifically address the
potential tensions that arise. Because of these similarities, "[t]he
protective rights accorded individuals in the workplace-protec-
tion from harassment and discrimination-ought to be accorded to
students as they pursue their education. 299
In drafting such a code, the goal would be to prohibit severe,
intentional, face-to-face verbal assaults that would disrupt a rea-
sonable person's ability to function effectively in the campus set-
ting.300 This aspect of the code would be race-neutral and drafted
in accordance with the recognized First Amendment exception of
workplace harassment. 30 1 Challenges regarding content-based re-
strictions on speech as well as viewpoint discrimination hurdles
should therefore be avoided because a race-neutral code does not
single out certain speech about certain groups. The speaker must
intend to cause harm, and the interference with the victim's educa-
tional rights must be objectively identifiable to a reasonable
person.3 °2
In further narrowing this provision, a university should employ
sanctions that are the "least restrictive means available to discour-
age prejudiced harassment. ' 30 3 In addition, the incident should be
"highly likely to produce serious psychological harm and a hostile
or intimidating educational environment. '30 4 Students should be
informed as to exactly what could constitute a violation of the code
so as to avoid vagueness challenges, and in suspect cases, "a pre-
sumption in favor of free speech should prevail. 30 5
298. Id. at 127.
299. Id.
300. See Delgado & Yun, supra note 210, at 886-87. The standard is not subjective
and, therefore, does not take into account a student's particular hyper-sensitivities.
The harm and disruption must be objectively discernable to a reasonable person simi-
larly situated.
301. See id. at 886-87.
302. See Gale, supra note 181, at 182-83. Under the language of Harris, examples
of interference would include that which affects a student's performance, retention at
the university, or advancement and achievement. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
303. Id. at 183.
304. Id.
305. Id. To avoid vagueness challenges, a speech code should be accompanied by a
set of explicit guidelines and seminars/workshops for entering students. See Lange,
supra note 293, at 132. Also, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Guidelines have been held to be sufficiently detailed to provide adequate notice to
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To avoid overbreadth challenges, constitutionally protected
speech must not be swept within the code's parameters. Therefore,
under such a policy, certain situations may not be actionable, such
as "campus debates, speeches or demonstrations, classroom discus-
sions, or conversations among students, unless the circumstances
clearly show that speaker intentionally singled out particular indi-
viduals for discriminatory harassment." 3" These limitations, when
taken together, remedy the substantial flaws in the Michigan Policy
and the UW Rule at Wisconsin.
For example, under this type of narrow, limited code, a student
who states in class that the arts are more suited for the women's
side of the brain and mathematics for the man's would not face
punishment. In addition, students who are members of a Neo-Nazi
group cannot be forbidden from holding a protest on campus and
brandishing flags with swastikas on them.
If, on the other hand, a student who arranged for a controversial
Nation of Islam speaker to appear during Black History month and
was then the subject of four death threats by another individual on
campus, °7 then that individual should be subjected to sanctions.
Also, in a case where a black quarterback is continually jeered and
threatened in person, and by phone and mail, the individual(s) re-
sponsible would possibly face punishment.3 °8 In both of these inci-
dents the behavior is a severe, intentional, one-on-one threatening
verbal assault that is highly likely to produce serious psychological
harm and an intimidating educational environment to a reasonable
student.
2. Race as an Aggravating Factor in Punishing Hate: A
Mitchell Component
A second provision to a campus code should incorporate a pen-
alty enhancement approach, that would increase the punishment
for any campus offense where bias was found to be a motivating
factor.3°  This approach is constitutionally permissible under
employers. See id. (citing United States v. City of Milwaukee, 395 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.
Wis. 1975).
306. Id.
307. See supra note 5, at tbl. 1.
308. See id.
309. See Delgado & Yun, supra note 210, at 887; see also Schimmel, supra note 144,
at 664 ("Where clear evidence indicates that some groups have suffered dispropor-
tionately from harassment or assault on campus, codes might provide that verbal at-
tacks against members of such groups would be considered an aggravating factor in
assessing punishment.").
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Mitchell and "would not single out particular types of expression,
but rather particular types of motivation at the punishment
stage. ' 310
Under this provision, any campus offense, such as vandalism, in-
vasion of privacy, assault or theft could be punished more severely
if bias was found to be a motivating factor. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that it is constitutionally permissible to consider
such aggravating factors as racial hatred in making sentencing de-
terminations.311 In Dawson v. Delaware, the Court held "that the
Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of
evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing
simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the
First Amendment. '312 Although Dawson does not involve a pen-
alty enhancement provision, its rationale applies nonetheless.
Moreover, motive is permissibly taken into account under federal
and state anti-discrimination laws, and where evidence of discrimi-
nation is found, one cannot claim protection under the First
Amendment's shield.313
A code, therefore, should be drafted based on a race-neutral Ti-
tle VII hostile environment model with a penalty enhancement
component at the sentencing stage for those infractions said to be
bias-motivated. Such a code would be constitutionally permissible
and would not place the Title VII statute above the demands of the
First Amendment. This solution is supported by the compelling in-
terest in protecting the university community from the serious
harm bias-inspired conduct inflicts.31 4
310. Delgado & Yun, supra note 210, at 887.
311. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949 (1983) ("The United States Constitu-
tion does not prohibit a trial judge from taking into account the elements of racial
hatred in this murder ... Barclay's desire to start a race war [is] relevant to several
statutory aggravating factors.").
312. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1992).
313. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993); see also Norwood v.
D.L. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973) ("Invidious private discrimination may be
characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.").
314. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487. The State's amicus brief argued that "bias moti-
vated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional
harms on their victims, and incite community unrest." Id. at 488.
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B. University Environment as a Place to Educate: The
Invaluable Role of Educational Endeavors in Ensuring
a Tolerant Campus Environment
In analyzing ways to deal with the problem of hate speech on
university campuses, one must not forget that the context is an ed-
ucational environment, the mission of which is to educate young
adults. In implementing any policy on hate speech, a college must
include an educational component that aims to teach students
about intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia and religious differ-
ences in a serious and meaningful way. A narrowly drafted speech
code would 'work to deter the most egregious and assaultive speech
directed at individual students, but in order to ensure long-term
change, educational programs must be put in place as well.
Critics of codes argue for more speech, maintaining that open
dialogue and exchange of ideas is the intent of the First Amend-
ment in this country. In theory this principle is true, and if every-
one had an equal voice and equal opportunity to be heard, then
speech codes of any sort would not be needed. Unfortunately, this
situation rarely exists. This inequality does not mean, however,
that more speech or open dialogue on the matter is not also an
essential component in furthering this cause. Serious discussion of
these issues should be fostered at a university through "countercul-
ture courses, in the traditional rhetorical and academic mode, to
examine and critically challenge hate-filled or bating or inciting
speech" or notions about certain groups.315
Non-academic avenues should be encouraged as well, such as
creating opportunities for demonstration projects and discourse as
well as mediation and counseling provisions for all students. 316 Mi-
nority student organizations should also be strongly supported in
addition to multi-cultural events and forums and workshops for
discussion of controversial subjects.3 1 7 It is critical that students be
provided with an opportunity to talk to each other and understand
their differences, not mock them. Perhaps by fostering differences
among the study body, speech codes in any form will become less
and less necessary.
315. Joseph W. Bellacosa, The Regulation of Hate Speech By Academe vs. The Idea
of A University: A Classic Oxymoron?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1993).
316. See id. at 12.
317. See id.
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CONCLUSION
When students are unable to pursue their academic goals be-
cause of assaultive, discriminatory speech, the university has failed
in its mission to provide an environment where every student has
an equal opportunity to succeed. Implementing a narrowly drafted
race-neutral code provision based on a hostile environment model,
in addition to a penalty enhancement component for bias-inspired
violations, is permissible, constitutional, and necessary to ensure
that the university's mission is carried out.
Such a code, along with forward-looking, long-term educational
objectives, would work towards stopping hate on campus without
stifling the speech of individual students. A public university can
no longer be permitted to hide behind the shield of the First
Amendment when students are being denied an equal educational
opportunity.
